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Article
Towards an Institutional
First Amendment
Frederick Schauert
How shall we subdivide the First Amendment? More spe-
cifically, along which lines shall we carve free speech and free
press doctrine? In designing the demarcations that are an in-
evitable part of any area of legal doctrine, shall we locate those
demarcations in distinctions among people, or among places, or
among forms of behavior, or perhaps among something else?
Subdivision is part and parcel of any body of law, and wisely
creating the subdivisions is as central to First Amendment doc-
trine as it is to torts, contracts, agency, antitrust, securities
regulation, and of course much, much else.
Traditionally, the First Amendment has been subdivided
on the basis of the content of the communication. To put it dif-
ferently, it has been traditionally supposed, roughly, that the
First Amendment's Speech Clause protects speech. The First
Amendment does not protect all speech, or even most speech,
but the speech that it does protect is protected as speech, with
relatively little regard for the identity of the speaker or the in-
stitutional environment in which the speech occurs. Conse-
quently, the type of speech involved not only distinguishes
t Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. This Article was prepared for the
Faegre & Benson Symposium on Law, Information and Freedom of Expression
held at the University of Minnesota Law School on October 22, 2004, in honor
of the University of Minnesota Law Library's millionth volume. Research sup-
port was generously provided by the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, and I have benefited from
Larry Alexander's comments on an earlier draft. I also thank my commenta-
tors at the oral presentation-Robert Post, Dale Carpenter, Guy-Uriel
Charles, David McGowan, and Miranda McGowan-whose remarks and cri-
tique have made the final version far better than it was in its first incarnation.
And I offer additional thanks to Carpenter for persuading me to omit the word
"prolegomenon" from the title of this Article and from anything else I may ever
write.
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what the First Amendment covers from what it ignores, but
plays the primary role in determining, within the universe of
covered speech, just how much protection is available, and
which tests and doctrines shall be applied.1
First Amendment doctrine is of course vastly more complex
than this, and the previous paragraph is an egregious oversim-
plification. Still, something of importance is captured in the
way existing First Amendment doctrine renders the Press
Clause redundant and thus irrelevant, with the institutional
press being treated simply as another speaker.2 So too with the
Supreme Court's reluctance, save for the exception of broad-
casting,3 to draw distinctions among different media, 4 or with
the Court's inclination to treat all government speech as func-
tionally equivalent, without regard to whether the government
1. This sentence presupposes the distinction between coverage and pro-
tection that I explain and defend in Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-74 (2004). See also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92, 134-35 (1982); Frederick Schauer,
Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 225 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981);
Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982
SUP. CT. REV. 285.
2. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795-802
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05
(1972); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). The literature on the
question whether the Press Clause should be treated as having independent
importance is huge. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Gov-
ernment Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980); David
Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1975); Anthony
Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (1979);
Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy:
What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Steven
Shiffyin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology,
25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 934-35 (1978); Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); William W. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press
of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977).
3. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
4. One good example is the use of the same understanding and definition
of "obscenity" across media as diverse as books, magazines, telephone, cable
television, and drive-in movie theaters. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.
564 (2002); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000);
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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is speaking as an employer, 5 an arts funder,6 a medical pro-
vider,7 or a library. 8
For several decades now, First Amendment doctrine's ea-
gerness to locate the important lines of protection along the
dimension of speech (or expression, or communication, or in-
formation) 9 has been subject to harsh criticism. For Edwin
Baker, locating the values of personal liberty only in speech or
communication makes no sense, and he therefore has urged an
understanding of the First Amendment that replaces the
speech/conduct distinction with the distinction between liberty
and nonliberty. 10 So too with Ronald Coase's challenge to a
First Amendment that treats communicative liberty differently
from economic liberty." Catharine MacKinnon has objected to
treating the consequences of speech acts as meaningfully dif-
ferent from the consequences of other sorts of acts. 12 Robert
Post has proposed replacing "speech" with "democracy" as the
basic unit of First Amendment analysis. 13 Larry Alexander has
argued that the effects caused by communicative acts are not
different, in any doctrinally or theoretically usable way, from
the effects caused by the full range of human behavior.14 And
for some years I have been questioning the very underpinnings
5. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
6. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
7. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
8. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
9. Although "freedom of expression" is the most common quasi synonym
for "freedom of speech," and although "freedom of expression" is a phrase
found in, for example, the relevant provisions of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 2, and the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, it should become clear that
substituting words like "expression" or "communication" for the word "speech"
will change neither the nature of the problem nor the approach I urge here.
10. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69
(1989); C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
979 (1997); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,
25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978).
11. R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 384 (1974); see also Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic
Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964).
12. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 30-31 (1993).
13. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1279-81 (1995).
14. LARRY ALEXANDER, IS FREEDOM OF SPEECH A HUMAN RIGHT? (forth-
coming 2005); Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regula-
tions of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993).
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of the speech/action distinction, a distinction upon which so
much of First Amendment doctrine rests.15
What all of these challenges to the category of "speech"
share is a willingness to question a doctrinal structure that
treats the distinction between speech and conduct as impor-
tant. As a result, these challenges routinely express either a
consequent willingness to expand the category of First
Amendment coverage to include those activities that appear
functionally equivalent to speech from a particular theoretical
perspective, and/or a parallel willingness to contract the cate-
gory of coverage to exclude those forms of speech ill-serving a
particular theoretical justification for the First Amendment.
Yet whether the goal is expansion, contraction, or both, what
most of these efforts have in common is a willingness to ques-
tion whether the category of "speech" is a useful unit of analy-
sis. 16 Oddly, however, those of us who have questioned the vi-
ability of "speech" as the major component of First Amendment
understanding have been reluctant to treat the existing but
contingent institutional elements of our collective life as impor-
tant markers along which we might cleave the First Amend-
ment-both in its initial coverage and in its various categories
of protection. Much of this reluctance stems from a view about
the functions and comparative advantage of the courts. If
courts are thought to have little ability to fathom the change-
able and empirical foundations of our institutional lives, then
there is an extraordinarily strong temptation to draw doctrinal
lines on the basis of, to use Ronald Dworkin's terminology,
"principle" rather than "policy."'17
Yet however strong this temptation towards institutional
blindness, there are good reasons to resist it. As documented
and theorized by people such as Niklas Luhmann, advanced so-
cieties are experiencing a growing institutional self-
reproduction and consequent institutional differentiation.' 8
15. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-
112 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
1284 (1983).
16. On the "traditional" review that "speech as such" is indeed the pri-
mary and appropriate unit of analysis, see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elli-
ott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
17. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 221-24 (1986) [hereinafter LAW'S
EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-31, 90-100
(1978).
18. NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (1982); see also
Niklas Luhmann, A General Theory of Organized Social Systems, in
1259
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And as the lines of that institutional differentiation become
more and more clear, the argument that courts should ignore
them becomes commensurately weaker. Moreover, if we can
trust our courts to determine, for example, the fundamental na-
ture of the game of golf19 or the status of knowledge about tire
failure as a recognized area of expertise,20 we might also trust
them to recognize the difference between the institutional press
and the lone pamphleteer, between the Internet and an adult
theater, between libraries and medical clinics, and between the
National Endowment for the Arts and the National Institutes
of Health. In all of these cases there may at times be difficult
lines to draw between institutions, but drawing those lines be-
comes easier to the extent that the lines, which may cut across
the distinction between speech and action, follow existing lines
of institutional differentiation. Carving First Amendment doc-
trine across rather than along the distinction between speech
and action may yield a First Amendment with less coherence as
a matter of abstract principle, but may also give us a First
Amendment with greater ability to deal with the genuine is-
sues of institutional autonomy that lie at the heart of the mul-
tiple but overlapping background justifications for the idea of
freedom of speech.
I. THE DOCTRINE
Described in the most simplistic terms, the constitutional
right to freedom of speech is about the (negative)21 liberty of
EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATION THEORY 96, 101-05 (Geert
Hofstede & M. Sami Kassem eds., 1976).
19. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682-91 (2000), amusingly
criticized in Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Casey Martin, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267.
20. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999).
21. As Lillian BeVier discusses in her contribution to this symposium,
Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer
Be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280 (2005), there are important disputes
about the extent to which the First Amendment should be understood in pri-
marily negative and government-limiting terms, as the doctrine largely re-
flects and as she and others support, e.g., L.A. Powe, Scholarship and Markets,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172 (1987), or whether instead the doctrine should
permit or even require various positive efforts by government to enhance the
First Amendment environment, as other scholars have argued, e.g., OWEN M.
FISs, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993). This is an important debate, but it is
not my debate here, and my arguments in favor of a more institutionally
aware First Amendment doctrine are compatible with either positive or nega-
tive views about the basic substance of the constitutional right to freedom of
1260 [89:1256
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certain actors to engage in particular forms of behavior. And in
equally simplistic terms, the existing doctrine tends to focus on
the form of the behavior and not on the identity of the actors.
Thus, certain behaviors22 receive protection regardless of the
identity of the actor, and government actions that reflect cer-
tain disfavored motives are impermissible regardless of the
identity of the target.
The doctrine is replete with examples of the agent- and in-
stitution-indifference reflected in the previous paragraph. Just
a few months after deciding New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
23
which dealt with libelous material published in an advertise-
ment in a major national newspaper, the Supreme Court ap-
plied the very same rule in Garrison v. Louisiana,24 which
arose in the context of verbal and unpublished slander by an
individual political candidate. When the Supreme Court crys-
tallized (more or less) the test for obscenity in Miller v. Califor-
nia,25 it did so in the familiar setting of a mass mailing of adult
materials. But having created the test for obscenity in the con-
text of sales of printed materials by mail, the Court has pro-
ceeded to apply the same line between the impermissibly ob-
scene and the permissibly sexually explicit to outdoor
theaters,26 to dial-a-porn telephone services, 27 to cable and sat-
ellite television,28 and to the Internet 29-with broadcasting30
speech.
22. Everything I say here is compatible with the relevant behavior being
the behavior of the government rather than the behavior of the "speaker." So if
government actions reflecting certain disfavored motives trigger the First
Amendment, see Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547
(1989); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmen-
tal Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Jed
Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001); Fre-
derick Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 NW.
U. L. REV. 562 (1989), the question still remains whether the impermissibility
of that motive may vary with the identity, character, or status of the agents
against whom it is directed, which as a matter of current doctrine it generally
may not. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-64
(1994) (applying analysis of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), to
cable television).
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
25. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
26. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
27. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
28. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000);
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
29. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Much the same can be said about
1261
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and nonprohibitory zoning of adult establishments31 as the only
significant exceptions. In refusing to create a constitutional
privilege for journalists asked to identify their sources, 32 the
Supreme Court relied in part on the inability of the courts to
distinguish professional journalists from the huge variety of
other individuals and entities who write or speak for public
consumption-an argument that persists to this day when
made by those who would oppose a journalists' privilege pre-
cisely because of the presence of bloggers and others whose
claim to such a privilege could not be clearly demarcated. 33 So
too with questions of access: a constitutional right of access to
courtrooms is guaranteed to the public and not just to the
press,34 just as a right of access to prisons and other govern-
mental facilities is denied to reporters and the public alike.35 In
upholding a filtering requirement for public libraries, 36 the
Court conceptualized the library as, in part, a purchaser of
books and therefore as a government deciding what to say. The
Court thus placed the library in the same conceptual hopper as
the government providers of health care in Rust v. Sullivan,37
the government employers in Connick v. Myers,38 and the gov-
ernment funders of art in National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley.39 And the lower court in the same case had conceptual-
the contrast between Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), developing
the idea of a modified obscenity standard when material was targeted at mi-
nors, and the more recent Internet-focused Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783(2004), and Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
30. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
31. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002);
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
32. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972).
33. This argument was made explicitly, at least with respect to judicial
line-drawing, by Eugene Volokh at the Media Law Resource Center annual
conference, held in Alexandria, Virginia, October 1, 2004, and repeated by him
in an op-ed column in the New York Times. Eugene Volokh, You Can Blog, But
You Can't Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A35. For Volokh, the position
may be part of a more global skepticism about line drawing. See Eugene Vo-
lokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957
(2004).
34. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986); Press-Enter.
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
35. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50 (1974).
36. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
37. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
38. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
39. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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ized the library, or at least part of it, as a public forum, 40 much
the same as a parade or a public park.4 1 Thus, when the Su-
preme Court announced, famously, that "[n]either students
[n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"42 it reaffirmed
the general presumption that First Amendment rights do not
vary substantially with institutional setting. While occasional
exceptions undoubtedly can be found,43 it seems a permissible
generalization to conclude that First Amendment doctrine has
been hesitant to draw lines between or among speakers or be-
tween or among communicative institutions, preferring over-
whelmingly to demarcate the First Amendment along lines rep-
resenting different types of speech.
Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to draw
lines among speakers or institutions, that reluctance certainly
is not a function of a Court that is squeamish about drawing
lines, even with respect to the First Amendment. The Court
readily distinguishes incitement from advocacy, 44 commercial
speech from noncommercial speech, 45 obscenity from inde-
cency, 46 public interest speech from personal interest speech,
4 7
public forums from nonpublic forums and from "designated"
public forums, 48 content-based from content-neutral regula-
40. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 409 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
41. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
766 (1995); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130
(1992).
42. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
43. Broadcasting is one, for sure, as is the largely differential (and defer-
ential) treatment of speech in the military. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding that a military base's open house was not a public
forum for First Amendment analysis); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(holding that there is no constitutional right to distribute political campaign
literature on a military base).
44. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam).
45. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
46. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
47. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). For an important critique
of the public versus private interest distinction, see Cynthia L. Estlund,
Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amend-
ment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
48. See Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In De-
fense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Robert C. Post, Between
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tions, 49 and subject-matter from viewpoint-based discrimina-
tion.50 Even though these and numerous other distinctions and
demarcations are at times elusive and slippery, the courts have
properly recognized that drawing lines is part of their job 5' and
forms an essential component of the process of adjudication and
the larger process of common law development. Only when
those lines track institutional differences do the courts appear
to have balked. It is thus surprising and anomalous that the
same courts that have been quite willing to distinguish the ob-
scene from the indecent and the commercial from the noncom-
mercial have been far less willing to distinguish media from
nonmedia, individual speakers from magazine publishers, adult
theaters from the Internet, and so on throughout most of the
doctrinal structure of First Amendment decision making.
II. THE DIAGNOSIS
The reluctance of the courts to believe that institutional
distinctions can have First Amendment significance and that
prelegal institutional lines might undergird legal doctrinal
lines can be attributed to a number of causes, some of which I
have suggested in previous writings.52 Building on this earlier
but more tentative work, I want to explore more fully here
what I believe to be the full array of causes for the Supreme
Court's continuing hesitancy to take institutions seriously
when designing First Amendment doctrine.
The first cause of an institutionally oblivious First
Amendment likely resides in the way in which institutional
lines do not appear lawlike, and appear even less lawlike in the
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
49. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amend-
ment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991).
50. See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 99, 101-02 (1996).
51. See Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On
Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 63 (1968); see also LeRoy Fibre Co. v.
Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J., concur-
ring in part) ("The whole law [depends on differences of degree] as soon as it is
civilized.").
52. In particular, the idea that the legal mind may be hostile to nonlegal
categories is an idea I discuss in Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particular-
ity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Prediction and Particu-
larity], and then apply, more superficially than here, in Frederick Schauer,
The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the
First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998).
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constitutional context, where Ronald Dworkin's distinction be-
tween policy and principle 53 looms especially large. However
frequently common law courts engage in quasi-empirical policy
analysis to make the common law, 54 such an approach seems
more alien to constitutional law, the prototypical "forum of
principle."55 So if judges believe that lines drawn according to
legal (and thus nonempirical and nonsociological) categories
are more faithful to the judicial, legal, and constitutional en-
terprises than lines drawn according to the prelegal categories
of the world-and this is the whole point of Holmes's famous
story of the Vermont justice of the peace and the churn 56-then
we might expect to see an eagerness from our judges to decide
in the categories of the law rather than the categories of our
prelegal and extralegal existence. What distinguishes catego-
ries like viewpoint discrimination, content regulation, public
forum, and prior restraint from categories like universities, li-
braries, elections, and the press is that the former exist in the
First Amendment but the latter exist in the world. And insofar
as many lawyers and judges, following Holmes, sense more
than a bit of bad odor when we design doctrine around the con-
tingent and variable structures of the world rather than around
the allegedly more stable (and, for judges, certainly more con-
53. See LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 221-24.
54. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 50
(1988).
55. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516
(1981).
56. When Holmes mocked the nonlegally trained Vermont justice of the
peace who tried to find the relevant law for the nonreturn of a borrowed butter
churn under the heading "churn" rather than under some legal category like
"replevin," Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address at the Bos-
ton University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 712-13
(1998), his point was that legality is largely defined by the extent to which le-
gal constructs rather than prelegal categories of the world are primarily rele-
vant to legal decision making. For present purposes, the important point is the
contrast between the influence this conception of the law still exerts and the
reality of modern law itself, which includes numerous areas of law-securities
regulation, for example, and perhaps even admiralty-that are tailored to the
prelegal and extralegal categories of the world rather than to doctrinal ab-
stractions. See Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, supra note 52; cf. Gerald
Leonard, Comment on Frederick Schauer's Prediction and Particularity, 78
B.U. L. REV. 931 (1998). For a recent and well-known example of the same de-
bate, compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208 (arguing that there is no more a "law of cyber-
space" than there is a "law of the horse"), with Lawrence Lessig, The Law of
the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (ar-
guing for the existence and desirability of cyber-specific legal principles).
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trollable) categories of law, we can explain at least part of the
resistance to shaping the First Amendment around societal in-
stitutions. For too many judges, it seems, delineating the con-
tours of such institutions would look like a rather unjudicial
enterprise.
Relatedly, some of this reluctance to move towards an in-
stitutionally specific First Amendment is explained by the fact
that understanding nonlegal institutions, describing them, and
then designing doctrine around them would take appellate
courts into empirical realms in which they are uncomfortable
and as to which appellate records are likely to be particularly
deficient. Especially for a Supreme Court that has been frank
about its lack of knowledge of new and rapidly changing tech-
nologies such as the Internet and other aspects of modern
communications,5 7 carving doctrine along lines that the doc-
trine-creator may only dimly understand appears to invite a
host of problems. Some of these problems may involve simply
getting things wrong, but more may involve the question of
change: How can courts, with their special mission of stability
for stability's sake, 58 respond to changing institutions and
changing technology and overcome what H.L.A. Hart famously
referred to as the "handicaps" of the "human predicament"-
"our relative ignorance of fact" and "our relative indeterminacy
of aim"?59
Yet although we should not ignore this dilemma of igno-
rance, in which courts both need and yet do not possess the
empirical information with which they must decide cases and
make doctrine, this is not an obstacle that by and large has
troubled the courts, however much it might plausibly be argued
that it should. As long as the Supreme Court is willing to enter
into empirical and institutional inquiry in areas in which nei-
ther the briefs nor the record below yield the requisite informa-
tion-as long as the Court with its own knowledge and its own
research is willing to opine about the fundamental nature of
57. See especially Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-53-(1997), and-Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
733-34 (1996).
58. To say that not everyone accepts this characterization is a wild under-
statement, but at least some of us do. See Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV.
1359, 1376-77 (1997); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defend-
ing Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 467-73 (2000).
59. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
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golf,60 the frequency of flawed ballots, 61 and the behavior of the
press in the face of potential legal liability,62 for example-
there should be little special concern if that same Court is will-
ing to opine about the differences--or nondifferences-between
journalists and bloggers, between speeches and magazines, be-
tween parks and bulletin boards, or between universities and,
say, for-profit trade schools.63
This resistance to institution-specific doctrine should per-
haps cause little surprise in light of the modern history of First
Amendment development and debates. From the time that Jus-
tices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Frankfurter debated the mer-
its of "absolutes" and "balancing,"64 cheered on from one side-
line or the other by Alexander Meiklejohn 65 and Wallace
Mendelson, 66 there have been few greater terms of opprobrium
in First Amendment rhetoric than "ad hoc." Perhaps because so
many prominent First Amendment litigants have been bad
people with dangerous things to say,67 and perhaps because so
60. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682-83 (2001).
61. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103-04 (2000).
62. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964). The entireSullivan rule is based on the irreducibly empirical and contingent premise
that publishers at risk of legal liability will refrain from engaging in "unin-
hibited," "wide-open," and "robust" reportage-a premise that may be more
contestable than the Court believed in Sullivan. See Frederick Schauer, Un-
coupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1341 (1992).
63. Implicit in this statement is the view that an institutional account of
the First Amendment might yield more of a genuine privilege (that is, immu-
nity from an otherwise applicable requirement, analogous to a reporter's privi-
lege) of academic freedom than now exists in current doctrine. On the basic
foundations for the claim to such a privilege, see Robert Post, The Structure of
Academic Freedom (unpublished manuscript presented at the Harvard Law
School Public Law Workshop on October 7, 2004). As a matter of existing doc-
trine, the privilege can be argued to exist, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 324-25 (2003), but it remains vanishingly small. See Univ. of Pa. v.
EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
64. The best overview and analysis of the debates is Laurent B. Frantz,
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962). See also
Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Men-
delson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1963).
65. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
66. Wallace Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A
Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479, 481 (1964).
67. Clarence Brandenburg in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
was a local Ku Klux Klan leader; cross burners have made frequent appear-
ances in the cases, see, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St.Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); and of course there is Frank Collin and the Ameri-
1267
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
many others have at the very least existed on the fringes of so-
cial respectability, 68 there has always been a worry that an ad
hoc First Amendment would be especially vulnerable to excess
constriction by judges and juries too concerned with the moral
or social undesirability of those who were carrying the First
Amendment claim. Some of this worry, that making the First
Amendment too person- or group-specific would weaken the
First Amendment, has seemed to leak-perhaps appropriately
and perhaps inappropriately-into the question of institutional
specificity as well.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, some of the resis-
tance to taking institutions seriously in the design of First
Amendment doctrine may be based on the mistaken belief that
the First Amendment exists, at moral bedrock, as an individual
right. If this were so, it would indeed be odd were the contours
of such a right to vary significantly with the ever-changing na-
ture of fluid social, economic, and political institutions. But it is
hardly apparent that the First Amendment is centrally about
individual rights in any strong sense. Not only does the First
Amendment frequently and properly provide protection to
other-regarding and harmful acts, a surprising feature for a
truly individual right,69 but a large number of the widely ac-
cepted justifications for freedom of speech are about the social
and not individual value of granting to individuals an instru-
mental right to freedom of speech. 70 If we embrace the First
can Nazi Party, Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); Village of
Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978), aff'd, 432 U.S.
43 (1977) (per curiam).
68. Indeed, much of the history of the modern First Amendment has been
created by the Jehovah's Witnesses, a group that Zechariah Chafee once char-
acterized as having "great religious zeal and astonishing powers of annoy-
ance." ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 399
(1948). And even such First Amendment icons as the narcissistic Lenny Bruce
were almost as infuriating to their friends as to their enemies. See Frederick
Schauer, The Heroes of the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2118, 2121
(2003).
69. See SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 10-12; Schauer, supra note 62.
70. Notably, understanding the First Amendment in nonindividual terms
is not inconsistent with thinking that the best way to protect the social value
is by granting individuals the right-standing, if you will-to enforce it. Thus,
we might grant rights to the Washington Post not because it has rights in the
deepest sense, but because granting it legal or constitutional rights serves a
collective interest in avoiding the bad government that comes from a govern-
ment unchecked by press aggressiveness. And we might grant rights to dis-
senters again not because the dissenters have fundamental rights, but because
giving them legal or constitutional or political rights to dissent might serve a
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Amendment because it promotes the value of the marketplace
of ideas as a facilitator of the search for truth,71 or the value of
checking government abuses,7 2 or even the value of facilitating
democratic deliberation among the populace, 73 then we perceive
a right to freedom of speech that lies not at moral bedrock, but
is empirically contingent and instrumental to something
deeper. And if the right to freedom of speech is contingent, em-
pirical, and instrumental, then it would be far less odd to think
of it in contingent empirical institutional terms than if it is un-
derstood simply and foundationally to embody-as do the
Eighth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause, for exam-
ple-an irreducible human right.74
larger social interest in minimizing the number of bad policy choices and
maximizing the number of good ones. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
71. I do not. See SCHAUER, supra note 15, at 15-34; see also Stanley Ing-
ber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
72. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
73. As stated in the accompanying text, the idea is a vision of democratic
deliberation, perhaps most associated with Alexander Meiklejohn, in which
the reference point is the process of collective decision making. See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). But to the extent that democratic
deliberation is seen instead, or in addition, in terms of the participatory inter-
ests and consequent self-governance of individual citizens, see Robert C. Post,
The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democ-
ratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603
(1990); Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Re-
form of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993), then this particular
argument in the text is, pro tanto, less applicable.
74. Ronald Dworkin argues, plausibly, that freedom of speech is an indi-
vidual right (a principle) in a strong sense, but that freedom of the press is a
policy because of its empirical and instrumental character. RONALD DWORKIN,
The Farber Case: Reporters and Informers, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 373,
375 (1985). Implicit in what I say here is that much of freedom of speech as
well as freedom of the press has this character, but that if we accept (as I do
and Dworkin does not) that courts have an important role to play in enforcing
second-order policies against first-order political preferences, see Frederick
Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1045 (2004), then the instrumental character of either right is no bar to its ju-
dicial enforcement, and no bar to the judiciary doing the best it can to make
the best second-order policy decisions it can. This will be more empirical and
variable than Dworkin would prefer, but then the large question becomes
whether constitutional courts have important roles to serve beyond the protec-
tion of rights in the strong sense, a proposition to which I subscribe but to
which Dworkin, at times, apparently does not.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
III. THE PROBLEM
So what? That the First Amendment remains hostile to in-
stitutional demarcations cannot be taken as an indication of a
problem unless we can identify existing or potential outcomes
that would be better under a different approach. Put differ-
ently, moving towards an institutional First Amendment only
makes sense if existing doctrine too often treats settings, insti-
tutions, and contexts similarly when, from the perspective of
some (or any) account of the First Amendment, they are sub-
stantially and relevantly different.
I do not want to suggest that any act of treating unalikes
alike is evidence of a problem. Treating unalikes alike is simply
what rules do, 75 and at the heart of a strongly rule-based First
Amendment 76 is the necessary and desirable suppression of fac-
tors and distinctions that would in other contexts be highly po-
litically, morally, or otherwise relevant. To treat cross-burners,
Nazis, abortion clinic protesters, Vietnam War civil disobedi-
ents, civil rights demonstrators, celebrants of sexual violence,
and authors of serious works about sexuality as functionally
equivalent is hardly a moral imperative. Yet such conflation of
the morally and politically divergent in the service of avoiding
content-based or viewpoint-based distinctions explains much of
the unalterable core of the First Amendment. Indeed, much the
same argument can be made about many of the other morally
and politically relevant distinctions-between the truth and
falsity of political and moral (and many factual) propositions,
most obviously-that First Amendment doctrine properly ren-
ders immaterial.
Nevertheless, there may be a point at which First Amend-
ment doctrine's institutional agnosticism has a highly distort-
ing effect. When the Supreme Court's unwillingness to deline-
ate the boundaries of the institutional press produces fewer
press rights-in particular, rights of access and rights to with-
hold confidentially obtained information-than exist in many
countries with a far more constricted view of freedom of speech
75. And treating unalikes alike is also, slightly more controversially, what
the concept of equality does. On treating likes alike and unalike, see
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 199-223
(2003); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1974).
76. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1989).
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and freedom of the press in general, 77 there is some indication
of a problem. When we are compelled to treat mass distribution
of detailed instructions for causing harm78 in the same way
that we treat an individual speaking to a live audience, we face
a different kind of problem: too much protection rather than too
little. And when First Amendment doctrine insists that the
Internet, cable television, telephone, newspapers, magazines,
and books are for many purposes indistinguishable, serious
questions arise as to whether courts have overlooked important
historical, structural, economic, and cultural differences among
the various channels and institutions of communication.
Part of the reason for concern is that with respect to some
topics the degree of protection may turn out to be too much, and
that is not an unreasonable view about what would happen
were we to apply the fiercely speech-protective Brandenburg v.
Ohio7 9 test to bomb-making and contract-killing instructions.
But the issue is not just the question of too much or too little.
Rather, another and distinct part of the reason for concern is
that the dynamics of the First Amendment may turn out to pro-
duce too little protection for what is most important if we con-
tinue to insist on drawing too few lines between culturally sig-
nificant institutional categories. Here the basic idea is that of
dilution, and the principle has its crispest articulation in the
case law in Justice Powell's opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n.80 In reacting to the common suggestion that com-
mercial speech ought to be treated in more or less the same
way as noncommercial speech, 8 ' Justice Powell worried about
77. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., forth-
coming 2005).
78. The most prominent reported case is Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), dealing with a manual for contract killing ("Hit
Man"), but the most salient questions are about Internet-distributed instruc-
tions for making and using weapons, or for engaging in various terrorist acts.
See generally David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 957 (2002); Isaac Molnar, Comment, Resurrecting the Bad Tendency
Test to Combat Instructional Speech: Militias Beware, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333
(1998); Bryan J. Yeazel, Note, Bomb-Making Manuals on the Internet: Maneu-
vering a Solution Through First Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 279 (2002).
79. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
80. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
81. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 526-28 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); City of Cin-
cinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (Stevens, J.); Daniel A.
Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV.
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what we might call the equilibrium point of such equivalent
treatment. It was simply not plausible, he argued, to expect po-
tentially false, misleading, coercive, and dangerous commercial
advertising to be evaluated against something like the Bran-
denburg standard. If advertising were to be evaluated in the
same way as ideological advocacy, it would be unlikely that
commercial advertising would get Brandenburg-level protection
and far more likely that Clarence Brandenburg and others
would wind up with Virginia Pharmacy2 and Central Hudson8 3
levels of protection-an equivalence which would have grave
negative effects on the core principles of the First Amend-
ment.8
4
Other issues in contemporary First Amendment doctrine
create similar risks of institutional "compression," and thus of
leveling down rather than leveling up. A Supreme Court un-
willing to distinguish among the lone pamphleteer, the blogger,
and the full-time reporter for the New York Times is far less
likely to grant special privileges to pamphleteers and bloggers
than it is, as it has, to grant privileges to no one. A Court that
believes it must apply the same definition or standard of regu-
lability on grounds of offensive content to both broadcast televi-
sion and Bob's XXX Adult Bookstore and Peepshow is, in real-
ity, much more likely to allow less for Bob than it is to permit
virtually everything for CBS during prime time or during half-
time of the Super Bowl. And a Court that must allow Branden-
burg v. Ohio85 and Hess v. Indiana 6 to determine which forms
372 (1979); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History
of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993); Martin H. Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 160 (predicting a Supreme Court that is likely to
move commercial speech "somewhat closer to the core of the First Amend-
ment').
82. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
83. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
84. For my own full development of what was originally Justice Powell's
idea, see Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the
First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1988).
85. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
86. 414 U.S. 105 (1973). In holding that a call for violent action-"tak[ing]
the fucking street"--'ater" in the day was not sufficiently imminent to sup-
port punishment of the speaker, Hess represents the Supreme Court's clear-
est-and only-articulation of the "imminence" aspect of the Brandenburg
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of bomb-making instructions on the Internet will be protected
is a Court that might be especially susceptible to pressure to
cut back on Brandenburg's protection not only for people like
Brandenburg, but also for people engaging in individual advo-
cacy but whose moral worth and substantive message is con-
siderably greater than was Brandenburg's.
All of this suggests that there may indeed be a problem in
need of a solution. Notwithstanding all of the empirical contin-
gency and sociological messiness of institutional demarcation, if
the persistent unwillingness to take institutions seriously pro-
duces both distorted doctrine and underprotection precisely
where it is most dangerous, then closer attention to institu-
tional lines seems pressing. While my goal on this occasion is
only to suggest a relatively new avenue of inquiry, rather than
to prescribe specific tests and specific lines, it may be worth-
while to look at what such an approach might yield.
IV. AN INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
I do not want to make my inquiry look more foundational
than it is. At least here, my concern is not with identifying
those deep themes in constitutional and democratic theory that
would tell us where to locate serious free speech claims and
how to distinguish them from the comparatively unimportant.8 7
test. Id. at 107-08.
87. Although egregiously compressed into one sentence, this is in part my
"meta"-characterization of work such as Robert Post's, which is also concerned
with social structure and the identification of special free speech domains. See
supra note 73. Post's work, however, is far less concerned than I am with the
identification of concrete and preexisting cultural institutions that might in
the large serve important free speech functions, and which thus might be de-
serving of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy as institutions, even when
they do not serve the purposes grounding the recognition of their institutional
autonomy in the first instance. Like the First Amendment itself, therefore, my
approach is categorical. The First Amendment is under- and over-inclusive
vis-A-vis the relevant background First Amendment justifications, and thus
there should be no barrier in principle to taking this categorical dimension to
the next remove. So just as the First Amendment is itself a coarse marker of
its background justifications, taking the relevant categories within the First
Amendment as coming from existing social institutions far more than from
background and thus more likely crosscutting theoretical justifications is little
more than the extension of a fundamental point about the First Amendment
itself. Institutions mediate between background theory and particular out-
comes, and I want to locate institutions as units of First Amendment analysis
insofar as particular institutions, maybe poorly but not spuriously, dispropor-
tionately reflect the concerns and limits of the First Amendment.
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Rather, I want to suggest that a certain number of existing so-
cial institutions in general, even if not in every particular,
serve functions that the First Amendment deems especially
important,88 or may carry risks that the First Amendment rec-
ognizes as especially dangerous. To the extent that this is so, a
recast First Amendment could more consciously treat these in-
stitutions in rulelike fashion, with the institutions serving as
under- and overinclusive, but not spurious markers of deeper
background First Amendment values. Like a speed limit sign
that moves the inquiry from dangerous driving to whether the
driver was or was not driving in excess of the posted speed, a
First Amendment doctrine that embodied the same approach to
institutions would analogize certain institutions to rules. An
institutional First Amendment would thus move the inquiry
away from direct application of the underlying values of the
First Amendment to the conduct at issue and towards the me-
diating determination of whether the conduct at issue was or
was not the conduct of one of these institutions.
Consistent with such an approach, 89 we might imagine a
First Amendment that less grudgingly accepted colleges and
universities as appropriate areas for highly (externally) un-
regulated inquiry, and thus as domains in which the array of
privileges in the strict sense-academic freedom as a genuine
immunity from certain laws of general application-was consti-
tutionally guaranteed. Much the same might be said about li-
braries, which are both (relatively) easily identifiable and play
a special role in knowledge acquisition. Similar arguments
could support an analogous privilege for scientific research,
even that scientific research that does not have a home within
a university. For all of these institutions, the argument would
be that the virtues of special autonomy-special immunity from
regulation-would in the large serve important purposes of in-
88. More accurately, various institutions may reflect one or more of the
First Amendment's background purposes. The First Amendment is one
amendment, and the Speech Clause is one clause within it, but there is no rea-
son to suppose that one clause reflects and embodies one and only one deeper
value.
89. And arguably consistent with the Supreme Court's willingness to
draw institutional and similar lines within the Fourth Amendment, of which
the separate principles for automobiles is one of the more visible and debated.
See Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth
Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993); Com-
ment, Toward a Functional Fourth Amendment Approach to Automobile
Search and Seizure Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 861 (1982).
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quiry and knowledge acquisition, and that those purposes are
not only socially valuable, but also have their natural (or at
least most comfortable) home within the boundaries of the First
Amendment.
For different reasons, as I have suggested above, we might
imagine a conceptually similar treatment for the institutional
press. Here the justifications might have much less to do with
knowledge acquisition and much more with checking govern-
ment abuse and providing a forum for democratic deliberation,
but the structure of the argument is similar. We 90 first locate
some value that the First Amendment treats, or should treat,
as particularly important. Then we investigate whether that
value is situated significantly within and thus disproportion-
ately served by some existing social institution whose identity
and boundaries are at least moderately identifiable. If so, then
we might develop a kind of second-order test. If there is a re-
porter's privilege, for example, we might ask not whether this
exercise of the privilege serves primary First Amendment pur-
poses, but instead simply whether the person claiming the
privilege is a reporter. Obviously, defining the category of peo-
ple who receive the privilege will be based both on the reasons
for having the privilege and the reasons for locating it in a par-
ticular institution, but the case-by-case inquiry will largely con-
sist of applying the rule, rather than applying the reasons lying
behind the rule directly to individual cases. 91
We might conjecture that there could be a similar approach
to the arts, and indeed just such an approach was urged by Act-
ing Solicitor General Seth Waxman in National Endowment for
90. Obviously the "we" is problematic and contestable, but implicit in the
argument here is the premise that courts might be the appropriate vehicles
both for determining which values the First Amendment best reflects, and
which institutions especially embody and promote those values. This position
itself incorporates the premise that antimajoritarian and (comparatively) po-
litically immune courts are the institutions most capable of protecting second-
order values like freedom of speech and freedom of the press from the pres-
sures of first-order policymaking. See Schauer, supra note 74.
91. This is an understanding of just what a rule is that I develop at length
in FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
Just as application of a "rule prohibiting driving while talking on a mobile
telephone" will focus on whether the driver was talking on the telephone and
not on whether the driver was driving unsafely or whether the driver was dis-
tracted, so too might an institutional approach to the First Amendment de-
velop rules whose application involves questions more focused on membership
in the institution than on direct application of the First Amendment's pur-
poses to particular agents and particular controversies.
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the Arts v. Finley.92 Faced with the prospect of unrealistically
denying the government the ability to make content-based and
viewpoint-based determinations in the expenditures of its
money, or in the alternative of unrealistically claiming that the
First Amendment was no more relevant to arts funding than it
was to a president's decision to dismiss a cabinet officer be-
cause of the content and viewpoint of her public speeches, So-
licitor General Waxman argued that "there is something
unique.., about the Government funding of the arts for First
Amendment purposes."93 It is hard to know with any degree of
confidence the extent to which this suggestion has influenced
the doctrine regarding arts funding, but Waxman's recognition
that the arts as an institution is an appropriate category of
First Amendment analysis is a far cry from thinking that such
a category ought to be expunged from legal and First Amend-
ment analysis.
An institutional perspective on the First Amendment
would not necessarily serve as a vehicle for more First Amend-
ment protection, even assuming that words like "more" and
"less" are particularly helpful in dealing with difficult First
Amendment issues. Elections, for example, might be thought of
as an institution, and an election-specific account of some as-
pects of First Amendment doctrine might produce greater im-
munity in some areas and less than existing immunity in oth-
ers.94 It might be, for example, that the mandates of fairness
and noncoercion would allow greater restrictions in the elec-
toral context, but also that the risks of government regulation
in its own electoral interests would allow fewer restrictions in
the electoral context than might be permitted in other domains.
Much the same might be said about various possibilities for
media-specific rules and principles. If First Amendment doc-
trine were to distinguish the Internet from the telephone in
much the same way it now distinguishes broadcasting from
92. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
93. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Natl Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (No. 97-371); see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 615-16
(Souter, J., dissenting); Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an
Appropriate Role in Government Funding of the Arts, 102 YALE L.J. 1209 pas-
sim (1993).
94. See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes,
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803
(1999).
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print 95 and broadcasting from cable,9 6 the change might pro-
duce less protection for some media and more for others. For
present purposes, however, the point is less about the degree of
protection and more about the kinds of institutions-all prele-
gal and extralegal, and all existing in the world without benefit
of much constitutional, legal, democratic, or free speech the-
ory-that might serve as appropriate units of First Amendment
analysis. Some of these institutions could be seen as appropri-
ate repositories of First Amendment values. Others might be
the loci of a range of dangers which might militate especially
strongly for restriction. But whether locations of special protec-
tion or special permissiveness of regulation, it seems increas-
ingly implausible to imagine that such institutionally defined
locations should play only a minimal role in the design of First
Amendment doctrine.
95. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), with Mi-
ami Herald Publ'g. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also Lee C. Bollin-
ger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
96. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000). Statutes
and regulations, of course, draw these kinds of distinctions all the time, just as
journalist shield laws draw the very distinctions the Supreme Court is afraid
of drawing, see infra note 100 and accompanying text, and just as various
statutes create the kind of religious exemptions from laws of general applica-
tion that the Supreme Court has often been reluctant to draw. Compare Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), and Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987), with Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510-13 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Once we recognize that an institutional approach to
the First Amendment would do no more than draw the kinds of lines that leg-
islatures and regulatory agencies draw all the time, the inquiry focuses on
whether there is something inappropriate about such action when taken by
judges as opposed to legislatures. A large literature addresses this problem,
see, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1
(2004), a problem existing against the background of the view that courts
should announce principles or declare meaning, leaving it to other bodies to
make more detailed implementing rules. But for those of us who believe that
the distinction among constitutional meanings, constitutional principles, and
constitutional implementing rules is largely illusory, see Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857
(1999); David Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
190 (1988), the fact that legislatures have for so long done what the Supreme
Court finds so difficult to do is less of a knock-down argument than it might be
for others. If there is no reason to believe that a legislative definition of what a
journalist is, for example, is any better informed than would be a parallel judi-
cial definition, the argument against institutional specificity becomes com-
mensurately even weaker.
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CONCLUSION
My goal here is simple. It is no more than to suggest that
we have over the course of eighty-five years of serious First
Amendment adjudication 97 developed a panoply of vague defini-
tions, marginally (at best) useful three- and four-part tests, and
slippery and hard to apply categories-all of which together
have produced a not-all-that-bad First Amendment terrain.
And thus if a moderately satisfactory set of outcomes in the ag-
gregate can tolerate loose definitions, fuzzy lines, and empirical
guesswork, then there is no a priori reason to believe that the
loose definitions, fuzzy lines, and empirical guesswork involved
in focusing First Amendment doctrine on existing social insti-
tutions with special First Amendment properties should pro-
duce worse results. Just as contract and tort law came to rec-
ognize the world of securities transactions as an institutionally
specific domain whose institutionally specific properties man-
dated special rules, 98 so too might First Amendment doctrine
recognize those informational, investigative, and communica-
tive domains whose more-or-less distinctive properties warrant
special First Amendment treatment. The Supreme Court in
Branzburg v. Hayes99 was perhaps right to worry about the
lines between journalists and other information gatherers and
information disseminators, and contemporary bloggers and
others are perhaps right to be worried that such lines would be
drawn to their disadvantage. Yet such a pristine approach to
potentially messy lines has never characterized either the
common law, constitutional adjudication, or the development of
First Amendment doctrine.10 0 And if the law in general and the
97. This is not to suggest that nothing prior to 1919 mattered to subse-
quent development, or to suggest that the courts have been the only drivers.
See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1-21 (1997).
But for present purposes the crude view that the First Amendment started in
1919 will suffice.
98. See Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, supra note 52.
99. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
100. Indeed, a look at existing journalist shield laws reveals that the al-
leged problem is largely illusory. Some of those laws employ crisp and thus
under- and over-inclusive designations, as with Pennsylvania's shield law, lim-
ited to those working for a "newspaper of general circulation," or a "press asso-
ciation," or a "radio or television station," or a "magazine of general circula-
tion." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2004). If a statute can sacrifice
accuracy for precision, then there is no reason to believe, except under a view
about the capacity of the courts that I do not share, see Frederick Schauer,
Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995), that courts in designing
doctrine cannot do the very same thing. More commonly, however, shield laws
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law of the First Amendment in particular can remain as toler-
ant of fuzzy distinctions, under- and overinclusiveness, some-
times arbitrary lines, and hard-to-apply tests as it has been in
the past, then there is no reason to believe in a world of grow-
ing institutional differentiation that focusing on institutions
qua institutions cannot, and should not, be part of the large ar-
senal of appropriate First Amendment techniques. I have not
here attempted to say very much about what an institutional
approach to the First Amendment would look like, and perhaps
this Article should be understood as an argument for why the
seeming arguments against an institutional approach should be
deemed inadequate. But even if I have done nothing more than
reverse the burden of proof, that reversal alone may suggest
that the case against incorporating institutional realities and
demarcations into the First Amendment is far weaker than the
Supreme Court and many commentators have traditionally be-
lieved.
are written in more general terms, as with Michigan's extension of the privi-
lege to "[a] reporter or other person.., involved in the gathering or prepara-
tion of news for broadcast or publication." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a
(West 2004). In such cases, it will be up to the courts to define "gathering,"
"preparation," "news," "broadcast," and "publication," and thus the courts will
be required to determine whether such language applies to the Internet, to
bloggers, to lone pamphleteers, and the like. See Robert D. Lystad & Malena
F. Barzilai, Reporter's Privilege: Legislative and Regulatory Developments, in
MEDIA LAw RESOURCE CENTER, BULLETIN: WHITE PAPER ON THE REPORTER'S
PRIVILEGE 83, 95-101 (2004). If existing statutes are comfortable leaving such
determinations to the courts, then allowing courts to address the exact same
questions in designing doctrine will not involve the courts in decisions any dif-
ferent from those that they are already compelled to make.
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